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Abstract  
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In this work, we examine if differences in social dominance orientation (SDO) moderate 
the effectiveness of mindsets of intelligence messages.  We suggest that SDO is a 
foundational ideological belief system, on which individuals vary, that maintains the 
desire to endorse fixed beliefs about the nature of human intelligence. Thus, attempts to 
change individuals’ mindsets should be met with resistance from those who strongly 
endorse the social dominance ideology—individuals high on SDO. In contrast, 
individuals low on SDO are less likely to use mindsets of intelligence to justify an 
ideological belief system, and thus mindset manipulations should be effective for them. 
We test these predictions across three experimental studies (NStudy1 = 271, N Study2 = 207, 
NStudy3= 313). Across the studies, we find that individuals who are high, relative to low, 
on SDO have more fixed beliefs about the nature of intelligence and show smaller effects 
of manipulations of mindsets. However, when comparing to a control condition, there 
was no evidence that high SDO participants resisted the growth message that contradicts 
their ideology more than the fixed one that supports it; additionally, low SDO participants 
showed heightened responsiveness to a fixed message. We discuss implications for 
theoretical advances in our understanding of mindsets.  
Abstract Word Count = 203 
Total Word Count = 4516 
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 Mindsets, or implicit theories, refer to the lay, intuitive beliefs people have 
regarding the changeable vs. fixed nature of human abilities (Dweck, 2000). According to 
the implicit theory perspective, individuals hold different mindsets about the nature of 
human attributes (e.g., intelligence). Individuals with growth mindsets believe attributes 
are changeable and can be developed, whereas individuals with fixed mindsets believe 
attributes are relatively unchangeable and static. Mindsets are attribute specific. For 
example, an individual could have a growth mindset about the nature of intelligence but a 
fixed mindset of athletic ability (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995). Regardless of domain, 
these belief systems are an important part of people’s motivational systems and influence 
both self-regulatory processes and goal achievement (e.g., Burnette, 2010; Burnette, 
O’Boyle, Vanepps, Pollack, & Finkel, 2013, 2013; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 
1999; Martocchio, 1994; Wood & Bandura, 1989).  
Individuals with growth mindsets are focused on learning goals, engage in 
mastery-oriented strategies, and maintain positive expectations about the potential for 
future success when facing setbacks. In turn, these approaches to goal setting, operating, 
and monitoring predict better performance. In contrast, those who believe in the fixed 
nature of abilities focus on proving their abilities, engage more in helplessness, and feel 
anxious when facing setbacks, which, in turn, hampers performance (Burnette et al., 
2013). Indeed, the compelling self-regulatory benefits of these mindsets mobilized many 
scholars and practitioners to develop psychological interventions to promote growth 
mindsets of intelligence in order to improve academic performance, especially for 
struggling students (e.g., Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002, Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & 
Dweck, 2007; Good, Aronson, & Inzlicht, 2003; Paunesku, et al., 2015).   
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Despite many successful interventions, there has been little to no focus on 
understanding individual differences in the effectiveness of mindset manipulations and 
interventions. In the current work, we suggest that there are individual differences in 
belief systems that make intra-individual shifts in mindsets minimal if not impossible for 
some people. More specifically, we suggest fixed mindsets serve as a legitimizing belief 
system to justify hegemony. Thus, decreasing fixed mindsets (or, alternatively, 
strengthening growth mindsets) can be more difficult for those individuals who are highly 
motivated to support the hierarchic structure of society—an individual difference termed 
social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; 
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). 
Social Dominance Orientation 
According to social dominance theory, societies can help curtail conflict amongst 
groups by developing ideological belief systems that legitimize the supremacy of certain 
groups over others (Pratto, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). People who are high on social 
dominance orientation (SDO) more strongly endorse ideologies, policies, and practices 
that maintain hegemony rather than those that counter it (Hoyt & Simon, 2016). 
Hegemonic social systems are maintained through what social dominance theorists have 
termed hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths, meaning “consensually held values, 
attitudes, beliefs, or cultural ideologies that provide moral and intellectual justification 
for group inequality, or even the oppression of some groups by others” (Hewstone, 
Stroebe, & Jonas, 2016, p. 445).  Legitimizing beliefs, such as racism, sexism, 
meritocracy, or political conservatism (Matthews, Levin, & Sidanius, 2009), all serve to 
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validate the superiority of some people over others, thus justifying the greater social 
power that some people have (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003).  
In this work, we examine the proposition that SDO is a foundational ideological 
belief system, on which individuals vary, that motivates the endorsement of fixed beliefs 
about the nature of human intelligence. For example, Yzerbyt, Rocher, and Schadron 
(1997) argue that “the best way to account for the existing social situation is to promote 
the idea that it stems from the nature of things” (p. 49). Perceiving human attributes as 
relatively fixed can serve to justify a hierarchical social structure. This idea is supported 
by research examining the belief in underlying natures, or essences, of people—termed 
psychological essentialism. A motivated social cognition framework suggests that 
essentialist lay beliefs stem from the underlying motive to justify and legitimize social 
hierarchies and inequalities (Keller, 2005; Rangel & Keller, 2011). Furthermore, fixed 
beliefs facilitate stereotypes, which serve to both explain and rationalize the existing 
social structure, by linking specific attributes to the very essence and nature of 
individuals (Yzerbyt, et al., 1997).   
In this work, we narrow our focus from the broader essentialism framework of 
beliefs about differences between people to emphasize the fixed nature of intelligence 
specifically (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). We focus on mindsets of intelligence both 
because the majority of mindsets interventions seek to foster growth mindsets of 
intelligence and because intelligence is a personal attribute that is especially relevant for 
justifying a hierarchical social structure. For example, significant research on system 
justification theory demonstrates that people justify the existing social order by 
attributing higher intelligence to higher-status individuals and groups relative to those 
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with lower status (Jost & Hunyady, 2002).  Thus, adhering more strongly to an 
ideological belief system that endorses hierarchical group relationships makes it more 
desirable to hold a fixed mindset. This can make it more difficult to promote growth 
mindsets in individuals who are high, relative to low, on SDO.  
The current research 
In summary, we draw on the motivated social-cognitive perspective to predict that 
stronger adherence to an ideological belief system that legitimizes hierarchical group 
relationships, that is, strong SDO beliefs, will be positively associated with fixed 
mindsets.  Moreover, we predict that the motivation to endorse hierarchical group 
relationships, strong SDO beliefs, will moderate the effectiveness of a growth mindset of 
intelligence intervention. If fixed mindsets help satisfy ideological motives, then attempts 
to promote growth mindsets should be met with resistance from those who strongly 
endorse the social dominance ideology. We test these predictions across three 
experimental studies.  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. In all studies, we recruited participants from the United States using 
Mechanical Turk, an internet marketplace used to recruit diverse online samples shown to 
be a source of high quality data (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Casler, Bickel, & 
Hackett, 2013). In Study 1, two hundred seventy-one participants completed the study1 
                                                 
1 Across studies, we selected sample sizes that yielded adequate power to test our predictions using 
moderation analyses (Aiken & West, 1991; VanVoorhis & Morgan, 2007). As is typical in online studies, 
there was some attrition across studies. We retained participants who completed both measures of interest. 
In Study 1, 50 individuals began the survey but did not complete the survey; out of these, 42% quit before 
reading the message, 22% did not complete the study after receiving the growth message and 36% did not 
complete it after receiving the fixed message. In Study 2, 46 individuals began the survey but did not 
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(56.5% female; 43.5% male) with a mean age of 38.33 years (SD=13.41).  
Procedure. First, participants completed demographic measures before 
responding to a measure of social dominance orientation.  Next, we randomly assigned 
participants to one of two conditions to manipulate implicit theories of intelligence. We 
employed standard procedures for mindset manipulations (e.g., Burnette, 2010; Dweck, 
2000). In the growth condition (n = 132), participants read a Psychology Today type 
article to encourage a growth theory of intelligence (see Appendix). In the fixed condition 
(n =139), participants read a similar article about the static nature of intelligence. After 
reading the article, we asked participants to summarize the theme of the article in one 
sentence, rate the understandability of the article for 9th graders, and describe in one 
sentence how the article described intelligence. Next, participants responded to fixed 
mindset measures. In addition to mindsets of intelligence, participants completed 
measures assessing mindsets of people and racial bias; the measure of interest in the 
current research is fixed mindsets of intelligence.2 Three attention check items were 
embedded in the measures such that participants were asked to respond a certain way 
such as ‘strongly agree’ to the items. Across studies, analyses are similar when including 
participants who did not accurately respond to all attention check items thus we retain all 
participants for analyses. 
Measures 
                                                                                                                                                 
complete the survey; out of these, 28% quit before reading the message, 37% did not complete the study 
after receiving the growth message, and 35% failed to complete the study after receiving the fixed message. 
In Study 3, 32 individuals began the survey but did not complete the survey; out of these, 53% quit before 
reading the message, 13% did not complete the study after receiving the growth message, 31% failed to 
complete the study after receiving the fixed message, and 3% quit the study in the control condition. 
 
2 After responding to implicit theories, participants completed measures on volunteering that are not related 
to the current research and will not be discussed. 
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Participants responded to measures using a scale ranging from 1 (Strongly 
Disagree) to 6 (Strongly Agree). 
Social dominance orientation. Participants responded to the 16-item SDO scale 
from Pratto and colleagues (2000).  Sample items include “Some groups of people are 
simply inferior to other groups” and the following reverse-scored item, “It would be good 
if groups could be equal” (α = .96).  
Fixed mindsets of intelligence. We used a well-validated and reliable eight-item 
scale measuring mindsets of intelligence (De Castella & Byrne, 2015). Sample items 
included “You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you can’t really do much to 
change it” and “You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your basic 
intelligence.” We recoded items such that higher numbers represent agreement with a 
fixed mindset of intelligence (α = .94) 
Results  
As predicted, social dominance orientation (SDO) was positively correlated with 
fixed mindsets, r (269)=.182, p=.003. To test the hypothesis that SDO will moderate the 
relationship between mindset condition and subsequent mindset, we used Hayes’ (2013) 
PROCESS macro.  This macro uses an ordinary least squares regression-based path 
analytical framework to analyze statistical models involving moderation, mediation, and 
their combination, termed conditional process modeling.  Specifically, we employed 
Model 1 to test our moderation predictions, regressing the mindset outcome on SDO, 
mindset condition, and their interaction (1= Growth message, 0=Fixed message).  
First, both SDO (B = .21, SE= .06, p < .001; CI[.10, .32]) and condition B = -.91, 
SE= .14, p < .001, CI[-1.17,-.64]) significantly predicted fixed mindsets. Greater levels of 
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SDO predicted stronger fixed beliefs in the nature of intelligence and those in the growth, 
relative to the fixed condition reported weaker fixed intelligence beliefs—alternatively 
those in the growth condition report stronger growth than fixed mindsets.  Next, as 
predicted, there was a significant interaction between SDO and mindset condition (B = 
.29, SE= .11, p = .012, CI[.06, .51]).  Simple slope follow-up analyses revealed that the 
mindset manipulation was significantly more effective for low SDO individuals (B = -
1.25, SE=.19, p < .001, CI[-1.63, -.87]) compared to high SDO individuals (B = -.56, SE= 
.19, p = .004, CI[-.94, -.18]). Alternatively, looking at the simple slopes across 
conditions, SDO significantly predicted mindsets in the growth condition (B = .36, 
SE=.08, p < .001, CI[.19, .52]) but not in the fixed condition (B = .07, SE= .08, p = .372, 
CI[-.08, .22]). These findings support the argument that SDO motivates the maintenance 
of fixed beliefs; see Figure 1. 
Study 2 
 Study 1 supported the prediction that stronger SDO beliefs and stronger fixed 
mindsets would be correlated and that SDO would moderate responses to mindset 
messages. More specifically, individuals who are high on SDO were less open to the 
mindset messages, whereas those lower on SDO demonstrated the typical between group 
differences—those assigned to fixed mindset message report stronger fixed mindsets than 
those assigned to growth mindset condition. Our primary goal in Study 2 is to replicate 
the moderation effects of SDO on the effectiveness of mindset manipulations.  We are 
also interested in examining if the mindset articles change SDO. Thus, in this study we 
measured SDO after the manipulation.  
Method 
SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION AND FIXED MINDSETS  11 
Participants. Two hundred and seven participants from Mechanical Turk (50.5% 
female; 46.2% male; .5% other) completed the study with a mean age of 37.85 years 
(SD=11.68).  
Procedure. The procedures were identical to Study 1 except for the order of 
responding to questionnaires. Participants completed the social dominance orientation (α 
= .96) measure after the mindset manipulation (growth condition n= 106; fixed condition 
n=101) and after responding to the fixed mindset measure (α = .95). Participants 
responded to the demographic questions at the end3.  
Results  
First, we sought to replicate our predictions that SDO will moderate the 
relationship between condition and mindsets using the SDO scores measured after the 
manipulation. Specifically, we employed Model 1 to test our moderation predictions, 
regressing entity theories on SDO, mindset condition, and their interaction (1= Growth 
message, 0=Fixed message).  First, both SDO (B = .26, SE= .07, p < .001, CI[.12,.39]) 
and condition (B = -.95, SE=.15, p < .001, CI[-1.24,-.66]) significantly predicted fixed 
mindsets. Greater levels of SDO predicted stronger fixed beliefs of intelligence than 
lower levels of SDO and those in the growth condition reported weaker fixed beliefs than 
those in the fixed condition.  Next, there was an interaction between SDO and condition 
(B = .30, SE= .13, p = .028; CI [.03, .56]).  The conditional effect revealed the 
manipulation was significantly more effective in shaping mindsets for low SDO 
individuals (B = -1.28, SE=.21, p < .001; CI[-1.69, -.87]) compared to high SDO 
individuals (B = -.63, SE=.21, p = .003, CI[-1.04, -.21]). Alternatively, SDO significantly 
                                                 3 Six participants did not indicate their gender and 16 did not indicate their age. 
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predicted fixed beliefs in the growth condition (B = .40, SE=.09, p < .001, CI[.22, .58]) 
and not in the fixed condition (B = .10, SE=.10, p = .284, [-.09,.29]); see Figure 2. 
Next, to test if the mindset manipulation might alter social dominance orientation, 
we conducted a univariate ANOVA, to examine the effect of condition on SDO. The 
analysis revealed that participants in the growth relative to fixed condition did not report 
different levels of SDO across conditions (F(1, 205)=.23, p=.630). Additionally, SDO 
was again positively correlated with fixed mindsets, r(205)=.252, p<.001. Thus, there is 
no evidence that the mindset manipulations alter SDO ratings, providing more support for 
the argument that SDO comes earlier in the psychological chain and is more of a 
foundational belief system that propagates fixed beliefs. 
Study 3 
 In this final study, our goal was to replicate the moderation effects of SDO on the 
effectiveness of mindset manipulations and to test a control condition without a mindset 
message. Because Studies 1 and 2 compare fixed and growth mindset messages, it is 
unclear to what extent the messages promote more or less fixed mindsets relative to their 
existing mindsets of intelligence. Thus, it remains uncertain if the moderation effects are, 
as predicted, driven by a resistance to the growth mindset message from those who 
strongly endorse the social dominance ideology.  
In summary, in Study 3, we seek to replicate the general pattern of findings—a 
positive correlation between SDO and fixed beliefs and for individuals high on SDO, it is 
harder to find an effect of mindset manipulations than it is for individuals low on SDO. 
And, we add a control condition to more closely explore the prediction that attempts to 
promote growth mindsets should be met with resistance from those who strongly endorse 
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the social dominance ideology.  
Method 
Participants. Three hundred thirteen participants from Mechanical Turk (55.6% 
female; 42.8% male; 1.3% transgender) with a mean age of 37.54 years (SD=12.30) 
completed this study.  
Procedure. The procedures were identical to Study 1 except for there was a third 
condition where participants did not read an article after responding to demographics and 
the SDO measure. Instead, they continued on to respond to the fixed mindset measure 
(growth condition n= 97; fixed condition n=105; control condition n=111). 
Results  
Again, SDO was positively correlated with fixed mindsets, r(311)=.221, p<.001. 
To test the moderating hypothesis, we again employed Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro 
Model 1 with a multicategorical focal predictor.  We used simple indicator, or dummy, 
coding with the control condition treated as the reference category. First, both SDO (B = 
.37, SE=.10, p < .001; CI[.18,.56]) and the fixed (relative to control) condition (B = .77, 
SE=.14, p < .001; CI[.50, 1.04]) significantly predicted fixed mindsets, with those with 
stronger SDO beliefs and those in the fixed, relative to the control, condition reporting 
stronger fixed intelligence beliefs.  There was a marginal effect of the growth (relative to 
control) condition (B = -.27, SE=.14, p = .056; CI[-.55, .01]) such that those in the growth 
condition reported marginally weaker fixed intelligence beliefs. Next, there was a 
significant interaction between SDO and fixed (relative to control) condition (B = -.39, 
SE=.14, p = .005; CI[-.66,-.12]; see Figure 3). There was no significant interaction 
between SDO and growth (relative to control) condition (B = .04, SE=.14, p = .758; CI[-
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.23,.31]). Conditional effects reveal that low SDO participants reported significantly 
stronger fixed beliefs in the fixed condition relative to the control condition (B = 1.18, 
SE=.20, p < .001; CI[.79,1.56]); however, high SDO participants reported only 
marginally stronger fixed beliefs in the fixed relative to control condition (B = .36, 
SE=.20, p = .072; CI[.03,.76]).  Additionally, conditional effects reveal that SDO 
positively predicted fixed mindsets in both the control (B = .37, SE=.10, p < .001; 
CI[.18,.56]) and the growth (B = .41, SE=.10, p < .001; CI[.22,.60]) conditions but not in 
the fixed (B = -.02, SE=.10, p = .818; CI[-.22,.17]) condition.  
Discussion 
 Little focus has been placed on understanding individual differences that might 
make it more or less difficult to shift mindsets. In this work, we took a motivated 
cognitive perspective to understanding effectiveness of mindset manipulations and 
argued that individuals who endorse inequality among social groups are more likely to 
hold stronger fixed, relative to growth, mindsets of intelligence than those who reject 
hegemony. Additionally, we argued that SDO will moderate the effectiveness of mindset 
messages such that those high in SDO will be more resistant to messages promoting a 
growth mindset than those lower in SDO. Across studies, we found that stronger SDO 
beliefs were positively associated with more fixed mindsets about the nature of 
intelligence. Moreover, we find that SDO moderates the effect of mindset messages on 
mindsets across three studies.  Across all three studies, we find that individuals with high 
SDO beliefs show significantly less change in mindsets between growth and fixed 
conditions than those with low SDO beliefs.  
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 However, the pattern of findings in Study 3 do not support the prediction that high 
SDO participants will resist attempts to change from a fixed mindset to a growth mindset. 
That is, there was no evidence that high SDO participants resisted the message that 
contradicts their ideology more than the one that supports it. More specifically, in Study 
3, we find that for those with high SDO beliefs, the mindset messages, relative to a 
control, only marginally manipulated mindsets in the expected directions. However, a 
fixed message, relative to a control, significantly increased fixed beliefs for those low in 
SDO. And, a growth message, relative to a control condition, marginally promoted 
growth mindsets. Study 3 highlights that individuals with lower SDO beliefs may be 
more open to fixed mindset messages than a growth message. 
There are three points that our research makes clear: first, SDO is positively 
associated with fixed mindsets, second, SDO moderates responses to mindset 
manipulations and, third, the motivated cognition theoretical explanation for the 
moderation effects is not supported by the findings in Study 3.  We elaborate on each of 
these below. 
First, our work contributes to the scant research examining individual differences 
in mindsets. Although previous research has focused on demographic and behavioral 
attributes that predict whether an individual will have a certain mindset such as income 
level, race, or previous academic performance (Aronson et al., 2002; Claro, Paunesku, & 
Dweck, 2016; Paunesku et al., 2015), limited research has explored other individual 
differences that may contribute to the adoption of certain mindsets. As far as we know, 
no research has examined the role of ideological individual differences in predicting 
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mindsets. A better understanding of these predictors of mindsets will help better identify 
those who might benefit the most from growth mindset interventions.  
Second, even less is known about individual differences that may influence the 
effectiveness of mindset manipulations. Additional and similar work finds that mindsets 
matter most in times of an ego-threat—“any event or communication having unfavorable 
implications about the self” (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1993, p. 143; Burnette et 
al., 2013). For example, African American students benefited more than White students 
(Aronson et al., 2002), at-risk students benefited more than students not at risk of 
dropping out (Paunesku et al., 2015) and growth mindset tempered the effects of poverty 
on academic achievement (Claro et al., 2016). Thus, the majority of work answering the 
question when do mindsets matter most, finds that the answer is when there are 
challenging situations. Limited research has explored individual differences that may 
mitigate the effectiveness of inducing various mindsets. A previous study illustrated that 
similar traits encompassed within a growth mindset such as a tendency to strive to 
achieve goals (i.e., Grit) moderated the short-term motivational benefits of the 
intervention such that those high in grit already were less likely to benefit (Orosz, Péter-
Szarka, Bőthe, Tóth-Király, & Berger, 2017). We sought to add to this literature by 
examining an individual difference in belief systems that might make it more or less easy 
to shift mindsets. 
Although SDO did moderate the effectiveness of the mindset manipulations 
across all three studies, our motivated cognition-based predictions that high SDO 
individuals would be particularly resistant to growth messages was not supported. Our 
findings indicated that the growth message was equally effective for those low and high 
SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION AND FIXED MINDSETS  17 
in SDO and those with high, versus low, SDO were similarly responsive (only 
marginally) to both the growth and the fixed messages.  Moreover, for individuals who 
do not have relatively high SDO beliefs, the fixed mindset message was more effective 
than the growth mindset message. More work is needed to gain a better theoretical 
understanding of why those high in SDO are relatively resistant to all, not just growth, 
mindset messages and why those with low SDO are more responsive to fixed, compared 
to growth, messages.  
Third, in trying to understand the unexpected findings in Study 3, we suggest that 
the moderation effect of SDO and mindset messages could be driven by different 
processes. For example, for individuals high in SDO, responses to mindset messages 
might be driven by other factors such as diminished receptivity to scientific arguments. 
For individuals low in SDO, the stronger shift in the fixed, relative to growth messaging 
may be a reflection of the way in which these articles are written. That is, it is perhaps 
more convincing, for people who are open to scientific arguments, to read about 
biological evidence related to the inherent nature of intelligence (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 
2011).  More work is needed that seeks to replicate these effects and tease out the simple 
effects.  
In terms of applied implications, scholars and practitioners are working hard to 
develop effective methodologies for psychological interventions designed to promote 
growth mindsets (Yeager et al., 2016). The bulk of the scholarship on mindsets reveals 
how growth mindsets are adaptive frameworks that lead to advantageous thoughts and 
behaviors such as enabling resilience in the face of challenges (Yeager & Dweck, 2012), 
and promoting academic achievement (Aronson et al., 2002; Blackwell et al., 2007; Good 
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et al., 2003). The benefits of growth mindsets extend beyond goal achievement; for 
example, growth mindsets have been shown to discourage stereotypical judgments of 
others (Erdley & Dweck, 1993; Levy & Dweck, 1999), and encourage positive 
interpersonal conflict resolution (Giles & Heyman, 2003). A better understanding of the 
role of individual differences in moderating responses to mindset messages can help with 
the design of interventions. Although our research showed that the growth message was 
equally (in)effective for those low and high in SDO, those high in SDO have significantly 
more fixed beliefs about the nature of intelligence to start with. This finding suggests that 
interventions to promote growth mindsets might be bolstered through efforts to target 
those who could benefit the most.  
Limitations & Future Directions 
Despite implications and applications of the present work, there are some 
limitations worth noting. First, we used Mechanical Turk workers as participants. 
Research on MTurk workers has found that participants are significantly more likely to 
hold higher education levels than the average population (Hitlin, 2016). Education has 
been shown to be strongly related to SDO, as a higher level of formal education predicts 
a lower dominance belief (Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994). Thus, future work should 
explore if the SDO by mindset manipulation interaction effect holds across individuals 
with less education and other types of populations, generally. 
Second, we focused on individual differences in SDO. However, social 
dominance orientation is likely not the only ideological belief system that predicts fixed 
mindsets of intelligence. By exploring other ideologies and beliefs, future research can 
help elucidate the theoretical underpinnings of the findings. For example, researchers can 
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explore other ideologies that are associated with justifying the status quo such as 
Protestant work ethic (Jost & Hunyady, 2002) or right-wing authoritarianism (Jost et al., 
2003) or other belief systems, beyond ideological, that stem from other motives including 
existential and epistemic motives, that might predict mindsets and/or moderate the 
effectiveness of mindset interventions (Jost et al., 2003).  
Third, we homed in on intelligence mindsets both because of the relevance to 
mindset intervention work and because believing in fixed intelligence contributes to the 
justification of social hierarchies. To further explore the potential role of justifying 
hegemony in the moderation effects, future work should examine other mindsets 
including those regarding people’s traits, or their mindsets of personality (Chiu, Hong, & 
Dweck, 1997; Erdley & Dweck, 1993). Fourth, we did not have specific predictions 
about the effect of the mindsets messages compared to the control for those low in SDO. 
Low SDO individuals’ enhanced responsiveness to the fixed message could be due at 
least in part to them having relatively lower extant levels of fixed beliefs to begin with. 
Additionally, it could be the case the low SDO individuals are more receptive to 
scientific evidence—making it easier to shift their mindsets generally using the typical 
manipulations of scientific articles. Future work should more closely examine the 
processes involved in the low SDO individuals’ greater receptivity to fixed, relative to 
control, messages.  
Conclusions 
 Individuals who are high, relative to those who are low, in SDO beliefs have more 
fixed beliefs about the nature of intelligence. SDO moderates the effect of mindset 
messages such that individuals high on SDO were more resistant to changing their 
SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION AND FIXED MINDSETS  20 
mindsets based on scientific evidence than those with lower SDO beliefs. Importantly, 
when comparing to a control condition, there was no evidence that high SDO participants 
resisted the growth message that contradicts their ideology more than the fixed one that 
supports it. Those with high SDO beliefs only marginally responded to both messages 
and in the intended directions. However, those low on SDO were particularly responsive 
to the fixed message. We hope the findings in the current work can be used to foster 
additional inquiry that seeks to understand for whom mindset messaging works best. 
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Figure 1. Study 1: Fixed mindsets as a function of social dominance orientation (SDO) 
and intelligence mindset condition. 
 
 
 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
Low SDO (-1 SD) High SDO (+1 SD)
Fi
xe
d 
M
in
ds
et
s
Fixed Message
Growth message
SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION AND FIXED MINDSETS  28 
 
 
Figure 2. Study 2: Fixed mindsets as a function of social dominance orientation (SDO) 
and intelligence mindset condition. 
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Figure 3. Study 3: Fixed mindsets as a function of social dominance orientation (SDO) 
and intelligence mindset condition. 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
Low SDO (-1 SD) High SDO (+1 SD)
Fi
xe
d 
M
in
ds
et
s 
Fixed
Message
Growth
message
No message
control
